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Today’s financial and management professionals are compensated in a vari-
ety of complex schemes, designed by everyone from lawyers to specialized compen-
sation consultants. While these compensation “packages” have traditionally been
available to the top officers of established companies, more and more they have
been used to compensate other employees throughout a firm’s hierarchy.1  The
complexity of compensation packages, which often separate what have tradition-
ally been considered “wages” from other forms of payment, allows employers to
take advantage of the system. As a result, employers may defer wages through
vehicles such as contingent stock options that subject the employee to forfeiture of
what otherwise would be considered earned compensation.
In Guiry v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,2 the court held that the plaintiff-
appellant’s unvested deferred equity-based compensation was not “wages” as de-
fined in New York Labor Law Article 6, Section 1903 and thus was properly
withheld by the company when the plaintiff was terminated.4  Consequently, the
court held that Guiry was not entitled to the protections of New York Labor Law
Article 6, Section 193,5 which provides that an employer may not make any
deductions from an employee’s wages unless that deduction falls within a set of
specified statutorily-allowed deductions.6  Under New York Labor Law Article 6
1. See Craig Gunsauley, A Lot of Hot Air?, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS, May 1, 2000, available at 2000
WLNR 220225.
2. 814 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1st Dep’t 2006), appeal withdrawn, 7 N.Y.3d 809 (2006).
3. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 190 (Consol. 2006).  New York Labor Law Article 6, Section 190 provides:
Definitions.  As used in this article:
1. “Wages” means the earnings of an employee for labor or services rendered, regardless of
whether the amount of earnings is determined on a time, piece, commission or other basis.
The term “wages” also includes benefits or wage supplements as defined in section one
hundred ninety-eight-c of this article, except for the purposes of sections one hundred
ninety-one and one hundred ninety-two of this article.
2. “Employee” means any person employed for hire by an employer in any employment.
3. “Employer” includes any person, corporation, limited liability company, or association
employing any individual in any occupation, industry, trade, business or service. The term
“employer” shall not include a governmental agency.
. . .
6. “Commission salesman” means any employee whose principal activity is the selling of
any goods, wares, merchandise, services, real estate, securities, insurance or any article or
thing and whose earnings are based in whole or in part on commissions. The term “commis-
sion salesman” does not include an employee whose principal activity is of a supervisory,
managerial, executive or administrative nature.
Id.
4. Guiry, 814 N.Y.S.2d at 617–18.
5. Id. at 617.
6. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 193 (Consol. 2006).  New York Labor Law Article 6, Section 193 provides:
Deductions from wages.
1. No employer shall make any deduction from the wages of an employee, except deductions
which:
a. are made in accordance with the provisions of any law or any rule or regulation issued
by any governmental agency; or
122
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(“Labor Law Article 6”),7 “wages” are defined as “the earnings of an employee for
labor or services rendered, regardless of whether the amount of earnings is deter-
mined on a time, piece, commission or other basis.”8  This case comment contends
that the Guiry court was incorrect; the plaintiff’s compensation met the broad
definition of “wages” under Labor Law Article 6.9
Martin Guiry, an employee of Goldman, Sachs & Co. (“Goldman”) from
May 1993 through June 2002, was terminated without cause.10  Guiry was an
account executive in the Private Client Services Group (“PCS”), an arm of
Goldman consisting of advisors to Goldman’s highly affluent clients in the man-
agement of their financial assets.11  Beginning in 1996, Guiry was paid on a
purely cash-commission basis.  However, in December 1999, Goldman replaced
the cash-commission compensation system that had previously been in effect with
a new compensation system consisting of three components: cash-commission, sub-
jective commission, and equity-based commission.12
Prior to the implementation of the trifurcated compensation system, Guiry’s
cash commission was roughly equal to one-third of the commission and fee reve-
nue that he generated for Goldman.13  In May 1999, Goldman engaged in an
initial public offering in which it raised $3.6 billion—one of the largest offerings
in history.14  In December 1999, following the success of Goldman’s public offer-
ing, the company distributed an internal memorandum titled the “Overview of
b. are expressly authorized in writing by the employee and are for the benefit of the em-
ployee; provided that such authorization is kept on file on the employer’s premises. Such
authorized deductions shall be limited to payments for insurance premiums, pension or
health and welfare benefits, contributions to charitable organizations, payments for United
States bonds, payments for dues or assessments to a labor organization, and similar pay-
ments for the benefit of the employee.
2. No employer shall make any charge against wages, or require an employee to make any
payment by separate transaction unless such charge or payment is permitted as a deduction
from wages under the provisions of subdivision one of this section.
Id.
7. Guiry, 814 N.Y.S.2d at 617. See infra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining what constitutes the
deferred equity-based compensation at issue).
8. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 190(1).
9. See supra note 3 (defining “wages” under N.Y. LAB. LAW § 190(1)).
10. Guiry, 814 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
11. Id.
12. Id. Guiry’s approximate compensation in 1996 was $400,000; in 1997, $654,000; in 1998, $877,000; in
1999, $952,000. After the three-part division in Guiry’s compensation, his approximate cash-commission
compensation in 2000 was $1,174,000; in 2001, $787,000; in the six months of 2002 before being termi-
nated, $325,000. Id.
13. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 3, Guiry v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 814 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1st Dep’t 2006),
appeal withdrawn, 7 N.Y.3d 809 (2006) (No. 04/101929).
14. Leah Nathans Spiro, How Public is this IPO?, BUSINESS WEEK, May 17, 1999, at 120.
123
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Changes to the Compensation Program of PCS Professionals.”15  The memo in-
formed PCS employees, including Guiry, of the trifurcated compensation sys-
tem.16 Additionally, the memo described the method of determining the amount of
compensation allotted to the non-cash components.17  It described each part of the
compensation system associated with the employee’s production of revenue for
Goldman, an amount dubbed the “Target Total Compensation.”18  The equity-
based component was to be calculated as a percentage of the employee’s total com-
pensation, according to a pre-set firm-wide equity-award table developed by
Goldman on a yearly basis.19  Additional variables, such as the price of
Goldman’s stock at the time of disbursement, also determined the number of eq-
uity-based units to be given to each PCS employee.20
The equity-based compensation was disbursed in the form of stock options
and in the form of Restricted Stock Units (“RSUs”).21  RSUs were essentially
promises by Goldman to deliver one share of common stock per unit in the future,
while stock options gave the employee a right to purchase Goldman’s common
stock at a specified future time and price.22  Each equity-based component was
subject to certain specified conditions laid out in “The Goldman Sachs 1999 In-
centive Plan and Award Agreements.”23  The equity-based component, pursuant
to the specified conditions, consisted of both vested and unvested compensation,
the amount of which was determined at the end of each fiscal year based on the
employee’s revenue generation for Goldman.24  The unvested portion of the em-
ployee’s equity-based compensation was conditional on his or her continued em-
ployment with Goldman as of the scheduled vesting date.25
On June 28, 2002, Goldman terminated Guiry without cause.26  Following
his termination, Goldman denied Guiry the unvested RSUs and stock options he
earned from his work in 2000, 2001, and the first six months of 2002.27  In
15. Brief for Defendant-Respondent at 4, Guiry v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 814 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1st Dep’t
2006), appeal withdrawn, 7 N.Y.3d 809 (2006) (No. 101929/04).
16. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 13, at 3.
17. Brief for Defendant-Respondent, supra note 15, at 4.
18. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 13, at 4.
19. Id.
20. Brief for Defendant-Respondent, supra note 15, at 5.
21. Id.; see also Guiry v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 814 N.Y.S.2d 617, 618 (1st Dep’t 2006), appeal with-
drawn, 7 N.Y.3d 809 (2006).
22. Brief for Defendant-Respondent, supra note 15, at 5.
23. Id.
24. Guiry, 814 N.Y.S.2d at 618. “Vested” is defined as having become “a completed consummated right for
present or future enjoyment; not contingent; unconditional; absolute.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1595
(8th ed. 2004).
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2000, 2001, and the first six months of 2002, Guiry generated revenue of $8.7
million for Goldman.28  Based on his revenue production in 2000 and 2001,
Guiry was awarded equity-based compensation worth approximately $140,000
and $33,000, respectively.29  This equity-based compensation consisted of both
vested and unvested RSUs and stock options.30  However, significant portions of
these earned amounts were subject to vesting dates; specifically, November 2003
for a portion of the amount earned in 2000 and November 2004 for a portion of
the amount earned in 2001.31  Goldman denied that Guiry had a right to that
compensation upon his termination because Guiry was terminated prior to the
vesting dates attached to portions of this equity-based compensation.32  Addition-
ally, since Guiry was terminated prior to the 2002 fiscal year-end, he was not
compensated with the equity-based component of his 2002 performance.33  Given
the compensation system in place at the time of his termination, he would have
been awarded approximately $35,000 in vested and unvested stock options for
his six months worth of revenue generation in 2002.34
On February 6, 2004, Guiry filed a claim against Goldman in the Supreme
Court, New York County, to recover the unvested portion of his deferred equity-
based compensation earned in the years 2000, 2001, and 2002.35  In response,
Goldman filed a motion to dismiss Guiry’s Labor Law Article 6 claims, arguing
that Guiry’s deferred equity-based compensation did not constitute “wages” under
New York Labor Law Article 6, Section 193, and therefore could be withheld
since only statutory “wages” were protected.  On October 6, 2004, the Supreme
Court, granted Goldman’s motion to dismiss.36  Without focusing on whether
Guiry’s compensation constituted “wages” the court held that Guiry was not a
“commission salesman” as defined in Labor Law Article 6, Section 190(6), and
that instead, he fell within an “executive exception,” which placed him outside of
the type of employee whose wages were protected by Labor Law Article 6.37
Based on this finding alone, the lower court did not address whether the unvested
28. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 13, at 5–9.
29. Id. at 6–8.
30. Id. at 6–9.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 8–9.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 8.
35. Id. at 9; see also Brief for Defendant-Respondent, supra note 15, at 7.  Guiry also alleged a cause of
action for employment discrimination based on his hemochromatosis. The employment discrimination
cause of action was not objected to by Goldman in its motion to dismiss; hence, it was not addressed in the
lower court nor was it addressed by the appellate court’s decision at issue in this comment. Id. at 7–9.
36. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 13, at 1.
37. Guiry v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 814 N.Y.S.2d 617, 621 (1st Dep’t 2006) (Tom, J., dissenting), appeal
withdrawn, 7 N.Y.3d 809 (2006); see also Brief for Defendant-Respondent, supra note 15, at 8–9 (con-
tending that Guiry’s position as a member of PCS at Goldman was mainly of a “supervisory, managerial,
125
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deferred equity-based compensation fell within the definition of “wages,” as de-
fined in Labor Law Article 6.38  Guiry timely appealed that ruling on February
7, 2005.39
On appeal, Guiry alleged that the deferred equity-based compensation pro-
visions, agreed upon in the year 2000, were in violation of Labor Law Article
6.40  Additionally, Guiry argued that his unvested deferred equity-based compen-
sation did qualify as “wages” and, as a result, he was entitled to the wage protec-
tions found in Labor Law Article 6, Section 193.41
In a three-to-two opinion written by Justice Friedman, the Appellate Divi-
sion, First Department, held that Guiry’s unvested deferred-equity based com-
pensation was not “wages” as defined in Labor Law Article 6.42  Applying
Truelove v. Northeast Capital & Advisory,43 the court held that Guiry’s un-
vested deferred equity-based compensation was a form of “incentive compensa-
tion,” compensation designed to give employees the incentive to maintain their
present employment and maximize their productivity for the benefit of the
firm.44
In Truelove, the New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff’s bonus
was not “wages” as defined in Labor Law Article 6 and thus could be withheld by
the defendant, Northeast Capital & Advisory, Inc. (“Northeast Capital”).45  In
that case, the defendant had paid plaintiff his first quarter bonus, but refused to
make further bonus disbursements after plaintiff’s resignation.46  The plaintiff in
Truelove explicitly knew that his bonus compensation was dependent on his con-
tinued employment with the defendant.47  Additionally, as stated in several
memoranda from the CEO, Northeast Capital would have to make a “certain
stated minimum of revenue” in order for a bonus pool to be available.48  Further-
more, if Northeast Capital was successful enough to declare a bonus pool, an
executive or administrative nature,” thus placing him outside of the protected class of “commission sales-
man”); see also N.Y. LAB. LAW § 190(6) (Consol. 2006).
38. Guiry, 814 N.Y.S.2d at 621 (Tom, J., dissenting).
39. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 13, at 9.
40. Id. at 2.
41. Guiry, 814 N.Y.S.2d at 617–18. See also N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 190(1), 193 (Consol. 2006).
42. Guiry, 814 N.Y.S.2d 617.
43. 95 N.Y.2d 220 (2000).
44. Guiry, 814 N.Y.S.2d at 619. See generally Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Perform-
ance-Based Compensation Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
227 (1999) (discussing contingent executive compensation and its effectiveness as a motivational force in
the workplace).
45. Truelove, 95 N.Y.2d at 222–23.
46. Id. at 223.
47. Id. at 222–23
48. Id. at 222.
126
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employee’s entitlement to a bonus and the bonus amount were entirely dependent
upon the “non-reviewable” discretion of the CEO.49
In Guiry, the appellate court held that the plaintiff’s compensation was sim-
ilar to the discretionary bonus in Truelove, and was thus outside the statutory
definition.50  Furthermore, applying the direct language of the Truelove opin-
ion, the court stated that Guiry’s compensation lacked “the ‘direct relationship
between an employee’s own performance and the compensation to which that
employee is entitled’ [as] contemplated by Labor Law Article 6.”51  Moreover, the
court stated that the value of Guiry’s unvested compensation “was ‘dependent, at
least in part, on the financial success of the business enterprise,’ ” thereby placing
it in the category of incentive compensation and thus outside the scope of Labor
Law Article 6 wage protections.52  Notably, the court did not rule as to whether
the deferred equity-based compensation was mandatory or discretionary, and in-
stead stated that a finding on that matter would not discourage the holding that
the compensation at issue was “incentive compensation.”53
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Tom questioned the majority’s application of
Truelove to the facts of Guiry.54  The dissent argued that the two main factors
used by the majority in Truelove to determine that the compensation was “in-
centive compensation” were misapplied to the facts of Guiry.55  The dissent dis-
agreed with the majority’s finding that the unvested deferred equity-based
compensation lacked a connection to the employee’s performance, stating, “the
amount of . . . compensation is determined by the employee’s productivity, as
measured by the amount of commission income earned in preceding months.”56
Moreover, the dissent argued that a major “criterion” that the majority applied to
the facts of Guiry, that the value of the unvested equity-component needed to be
tied to the employee’s productivity, was not found in the rationale or language of
Truelove.57  In addition, the dissent questioned both the lower and appellate
court’s overall holdings due to the lack of what the dissent considered two critical
pieces of evidence: Guiry’s employment contract and Goldman’s stock incentive
plan.58
49. Id. at 222–23.
50. Guiry v. Goldman Sachs Co., 814 N.Y.S.2d 617, 619 (1st Dep’t 2006), appeal withdrawn, 7 N.Y.3d 809
(2006) (citing Truelove, 95 N.Y.2d at 224).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 619–20.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 620–23 (Tom, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 622–23 (citing Truelove, 95 N.Y.2d at 224).
56. Id. at 622.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 621–23 (“Since no employment contract has been furnished, the capacity in which plaintiff was
hired . . . cannot be ascertained, and further proceedings are required to determine plaintiff’s employment
127
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In Guiry,59 the court held that the plaintiff-appellant’s unvested deferred
equity-based compensation was found not to constitute “wages” as defined in La-
bor Law Article 6, Section 19060 and thus was properly withheld by the employer
because it was not entitled to the protections of Labor Law Article 6, Section
193.61  The issue in Guiry was whether the plaintiff had a cause of action under
Labor Law Article 6 to recover for the loss of earned wages, that is, wages in the
form of equity-based compensation, after being terminated by his employer with-
out cause.62  In Guiry, the court failed to recognize the critical factual distinctions
between Guiry and Truelove; namely the entirely different objective and subjec-
tive compensation systems at issue, and the correlation between the compensation
awarded and the revenue generated by the employees.63  Furthermore, the court
should have foreseen the potential future compensation issues that will arise as a
result of its ruling and, therefore, should have held that Guiry’s unvested deferred
equity-based compensation was “wages” as defined in Labor Law Article 6.64
The majority in Guiry misapplied the Truelove precedent by failing to
make several critical factual distinctions between Guiry and Truelove.  First
and foremost, the compensation at issue in Guiry in no way parallels the discre-
tionary bonus sought by the plaintiff in Truelove.65  In Truelove, the plaintiff’s
offer of employment explicitly stated that a “bonus, if paid, w[ould] reflect a com-
bination of the individual’s performance and Northeast Capital’s performance.”66
The bonus was dependent on Northeast Capital’s performance because it was
dependent on a “bonus pool.”67  The scheme based the cumulative bonus to be
awarded to all employees based on the company’s revenue that exceeded the mini-
mum revenue requirements as determined by the CEO.68  Therefore, the award-
ing of any bonus was entirely dependent on the performance of Northeast Capital
because no bonus would have been awarded if the firm did not make a certain
status . . . . Although it might be dispositive, the stock incentive plan is not contained in the record, and
the effect of its provisions cannot otherwise be determined . . . .  The majority speculates, based on missing
documentary evidence . . . that the amount of the bonus pool is dependent upon the firm’s financial
performance . . . .”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 617 (majority opinion).
60. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 190(1) (Consol. 2006).
61. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 193 (Consol. 2006).
62. Guiry, 814 N.Y.S.2d at 617.
63. Compare Truelove v. Northeast Capital & Advisory, 95 N.Y.2d 220 (2000) (involving a conditional
bonus plan contingent upon a performance-based analysis as well as the CEO’s discretion) with Guiry,
814 N.Y.S.2d 617 (involving a trifurcated compensation system, consisting of three components: cash-
commission, subjective, and equity based).
64. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 190(1).
65. Truelove, 95 N.Y.2d. at 224.
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amount of revenue.  Additionally, it was expressly stated in interoffice memo-
randa that the bonus was to be awarded at the “sole discretion” of the CEO and
based on an “acceptable” employee performance evaluation.69  This directly con-
trasts with the facts of Guiry where the plaintiff was to be awarded stock options
and RSUs based on a fixed equity-award table and the employee’s revenue gen-
eration.70  The two compensation systems are neither similar in their substance
nor their form.  The compensation scheme in Truelove was based on the per-
formance of the employer  as a whole, subject to the discretionary, subjective de-
termination of the CEO.71  The compensation system at issue in Guiry was
based on the personal productivity of the employee  and a fixed, objective equity-
award table.72  The Guiry court should have recognized these critical factual
distinctions.73
As stated by the court in Truelove, “[d]iscretionary additional remunera-
tion, as a share in a reward to all employees for the success of the employer’s
entrepreneurship, falls outside the protection of the statute.”74  Guiry, however,
was not rewarded for the “employer’s entrepreneurship,” but was instead re-
warded for his own entrepreneurship.75  It was up to Guiry to successfully man-
age Goldman’s wealthy clients’ financial assets76 using a variety of financial
instruments available to him, from equity and fixed-income to alternative
investments.77
Furthermore, the court in Guiry stated that “incentive compensation” did
not fall under the statutory  wage protections because incentive compensation fell
outside the scope of the Section 190 definition of “wages,” which states that wages
are “the earnings of an employee for labor or services rendered, regardless of
whether the amount of earnings is determined on a time, piece, commission or
other basis.”78  However, the court’s categorization of Guiry’s compensation as
incentive compensation, defined as compensation lacking a “direct relationship
69. Id. at 222–23.
70. Guiry v. Goldman Sachs Co., 814 N.Y.S.2d 617, 618 (1st Dep’t 2006), appeal withdrawn, 7 N.Y.3d 809
(2006).
71. Truelove, 95 N.Y.2d at 224.
72. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 13, at 4; see also Reply Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellant at 20,
Guiry v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 814 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1st Dep’t 2006), appeal withdrawn, 7 N.Y.3d 809
(2006) (No. 04/101929).
73. See infra pp. 131–32 (drawing a comparison of Goldman’s objective compensation determination to the
objective formula-based compensation determination in Reilly v. NatWest, 181 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 1999),
a factor deemed dispositive in defining the compensation as Labor Law Article 6 “wages” in Reilly).
74. Truelove, 95 N.Y.2d at 224.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Guiry v. Goldman Sachs Co., 814 N.Y.S.2d 617, 618 (1st Dep’t 2006), appeal withdrawn, 7 N.Y.3d 809
(2006).
77. Brief for Defendant-Respondent, supra note 15, at 4.
78. Guiry, 814 N.Y.S.2d at 617. See also N.Y. LAB. LAW § 190(1) (Consol. 2006).
129
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between an employee’s own performance and the compensation to which that
employee is entitled,” was incorrect.79  The unvested deferred equity-based com-
pensation at issue in Guiry was directly tied to Guiry’s productivity because it
was awarded based on the revenue he grossed for Goldman.80
On the face of Truelove’s complaint, it was evident that the issue of whether
the compensation at issue was a “bonus” or not was conceded by the plaintiff.81
However, nowhere in Guiry’s complaint did Guiry allege that the compensation
at issue was a “bonus.”82  Before December 1999, Guiry was compensated on an
“all-cash commission-only basis;” Goldman instituted the trifurcated compensa-
tion system, however, post-December 1999.83  The trifurcated compensation sys-
tem simply awarded deferred equity-based compensation based on a firm-wide
equity-award table, set by Goldman on a yearly basis.84  Because “the higher the
employee’s total compensation, the greater the percentage allocated to the equity
component,” it was simply a percentage of his entitled income, not a “bonus” layer
in addition to his entitled income.85
Moreover, the court should have distinguished Guiry from Truelove be-
cause Truelove was in a “non-revenue generating position” with Northeast Cap-
ital,86 whereas Guiry was in a position to, and in fact did, generate substantial
revenue for Goldman.87  In 2000, 2001, and the first six months of 2002, Guiry
generated revenue of $4.6 million, $2.9 million, and $1.2 million for Goldman,
respectively.88  Based on this factual distinction, it is apparent that Guiry’s ser-
vices rendered for Goldman were of substantial value.  It would seem illogical on
the basic contract principle of restitution interest89 and against Labor Law Arti-
cle 6, Section 193, to withhold compensation earned on account of value-render-
ing services already performed.90
79. Guiry, 814 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
80. Id. at 618; see also Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 72, at 20.
81. Truelove v. Northeast Capital & Advisory, 95 N.Y.2d 220, 222 (2000) (“[Truelove’s] complaint alleges
that his bonus constituted ‘wages’ within the meaning of Labor Law § 190(1) . . . .”).
82. See generally Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 13. See also Guiry, 814 N.Y.S.2d 617.
83. Guiry, 814 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
84. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 13, at 4.
85. Id. at 4–5.
86. Truelove, 95 N.Y.2d at 222.
87. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 13, at 6–9.
88. Id.
89. “Restitution interest” is defined as “a nonbreaching party’s interest in preventing the breaching party from
retaining a benefit received under the contract and thus being unjustly enriched. The benefit may have
been received from the nonbreaching party or from a third party.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 829 (8th
ed. 2004).
90. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 193 (Consol. 2006). See also Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 72, at
20.
130
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Furthermore, Truelove voluntarily resigned from his employment with
Northeast Capital,91 whereas Guiry was terminated by Goldman without
cause.92  Truelove had the option of maintaining his employment with Northeast
Capital; however, even with the explicit knowledge that his bonus was contin-
gent on his continued employment with the defendant, he resigned.93  In contrast,
Guiry was terminated without cause and under the alleged ground of employ-
ment discrimination.94  Guiry had no choice as to whether to continue employ-
ment with his firm and, in effect, Goldman was able to preserve to itself the
value of Guiry’s previously-rendered services.95  While this in no way should
have been the deciding factor, it should have been a significant distinguishing
factor in the Guiry court’s rationale.  The majority in Truelove clearly recog-
nized in its determination that the plaintiff’s resignation had factual
significance.96
Reilly v. NatWest, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, lends further support to Guiry’s position.97  In Reilly, the defen-
dant, investment bank NatWest, hired the plaintiff, employee Michael Reilly, at
a salary of $200,000 plus a bonus; the bonus was to be determined by a “Percent-
age Bonus formula.”98  After approximately a year and one-half of employment,
Reilly was fired by NatWest and was denied his bonus.99  Reilly sued NatWest to
recover his compensation under Labor Law Article 6.100  The Second Circuit
stated, “[the defendant’s] pay was guaranteed under the Percentage Bonus
formula to be a percentage of the revenue he generated, and was not left to
NatWest’s discretion.”101  Based on this finding, the court in Reilly held that
Reilly’s bonus was within the scope of “wages” as defined in Labor Law Article 6,
and, by implication, protected by Labor Law Article 6 wage protections.102  Like
the commission in Reilly, the compensation at issue in Guiry was granted ac-
91. Truelove, 95 N.Y.2d at 223.
92. Guiry v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 814 N.Y.S.2d 617, 618 (1st Dep’t 2006), appeal withdrawn, 7 N.Y.3d
809 (2006); see also Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 13, at 3.
93. Truelove, 95 N.Y.2d at 223. Both the terms of Truelove’s bonus plan and the continued employment
contingency were expressly stated in two memos issued by Northeast Capital & Advisory, Inc.’s CEO. Id.
at 222–23.
94. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
95. Guiry, 814 N.Y.S.2d 617.
96. Truelove, 95 N.Y.2d at 225. See infra pp. 132–33 (discussing how the holding in Guiry may enable
employers to take advantage of employees through unvested compensation and terminations without
cause).
97. 181 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 1999).
98. Id. at 259.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Reilly, 181 F.3d at 265.
102. Id.
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cording to a fixed equity-award table, as a percentage of Guiry’s revenue genera-
tion for Goldman.103  Therefore, the unvested deferred equity-based
compensation was not based on Goldman’s discretion and should have been held
to constitute “wages” as defined under the statute.
In Daley v. Related Companies,104 the Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, held that the plaintiff’s compensation was not “incentive compensation,”
but rather “wages” as defined in Labor Law Article 6, Section 190, and thus
entitled the plaintiff to his commissions.105  William Daley, the plaintiff-appel-
lant in Daley and former Vice-President of the defendant, The Related Compa-
nies, Inc., sued the defendant for his commission compensation derived from real
estate syndications he was involved in during his employment.106  The Daley
court based its decision on the fact that the employment agreement between the
parties “did not guarantee” the defendant a fixed-base salary tied with additional
incentive compensation.107  Similar to Daley, Guiry was never guaranteed a
fixed-based salary at any point in his employment with Goldman.108  The court
should have noted this in determining whether Guiry’s compensation constituted
“wages” as defined in Labor Law Article 6. This factual similarity would have
led the court to conclude that Guiry’s compensation was not “incentive compensa-
tion,” and thus was entitled to Labor Law Article 6 wage protections.
Finally, the Guiry court should have realized the potential future compen-
sation issues that may arise as a result of its holding.  The purpose of Labor Law
Article 6, Section 193, is to prevent employers from making deductions from
wages of an employee except in certain statutorily-specified instances.109  If em-
ployers may deduct compensation awarded to an employee based on that em-
ployee’s already-rendered services simply because the awarded compensation is, at
the time of that employee’s termination, “unvested,” then employers would be
creating a deduction that is not within the allowable statutorily-specified in-
stances laid out in Labor Law Article 6, Section 193.110  In Truelove, the defen-
dant paid the plaintiff his first quarter bonus installment, but refused to make
further payments after plaintiff’s resignation.111  The plaintiff in Truelove
knew explicitly that his compensation was dependent on his continued employ-
103. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 13, at 4; see also Reply-Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra
note 72, at 19–20.
104. 581 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1st Dep’t 1992).
105. Id. at 761; see also N.Y. LAB. LAW § 190(1) (Consol. 2006).
106. Daley, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
107. Id. at 761; see also Reply-Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 72, at 23–24.
108. See supra pp. 123–24.
109. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 193(1)–(2) (Consol. 2006).
110. Id.
111. Truelove v. Northeast Capital & Advisory, 95 N.Y.2d 220, 223 (2000).
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ment with the defendant.112  The plaintiff had the choice to stay with his firm,
but instead chose to resign and thus “willfully” forfeited his discretionary bo-
nus.113  In contrast, Guiry was terminated and then denied his unvested deferred
equity-based compensation.114  Consequently, the court’s holding, in the context of
a termination without cause, undermines the wage protections laid out in Labor
Law Article 6, Section 193.115
It is important to note that stock option compensation was partially in the
interests of the companies that provided it.116  Companies that offered stock op-
tions to their employees at fair market value did not need to report this type of
compensation “expense” on the company balance sheet.117  Instead, investors
funded the stock option compensation, as opposed to corporate profits.118  In 2002,
37 percent of the nation’s employers used stock option compensation to compensate
its employees.119  Nearly 26 percent of the nation’s employers provided some form
of equity-based compensation to employees, usually in the form of stock options, in
2006.120  While the exact number of employees within the percentage is unclear, a
study in 2000 estimated that between seven million and ten million employees
received stock options in the year 2000 alone.121
While Guiry may be a New York employment law case, the growth in the
number of people being compensated with stock options is growing nationally, as
well as in the state of New York.122  By denying the protections of Labor Law
Article 6, Section 193, to unvested stock option compensation, employers can com-
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See supra p. 130 (describing the revenue Guiry generated at Goldman and the manner in which he was
terminated).
115. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 193.
116. Gunsauley, supra note 1.
117. Id.
118. Id.; see SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 123, at ii (Fin. Account-
ing Standards Bd. 2004) (requiring the cost of equity compensation to be reflected in the financial state-
ments of public entities by measuring “the cost of employee services received in exchange for an award of
equity instruments based on the grant-date fair value of the award . . . .”).
119. See Lydell C. Bridgeford, 2007 Salary Forecast Reveals Modest Pay Raises for Average Workers,
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS, Oct. 1, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 17037717.
120. See Leah Carlson Shepherd, Exercising stock options: When is the right time?, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
NEWS, Sept. 1, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 15164419.
121. Gunsauley, supra note 1.
122. See Greg Ip, How Stock Options Muddle the Relationship Among Wages, Corporate Profits, and
Inflation, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2006, at A2 (“The answer seems to be stock options, a growing part of
compensation for top-end workers.”).  A majority of the stock option compensation plans affect those in the
financial services industry.  New York City is considered the financial capital of the country, if not the
world; thus, it would seem implicit that stock option issues would have a significant impact on New York
State. See Shepherd, supra note 120 (“The benefit has a higher penetration in the service and finance
industries . . . .”).
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pensate an employee for his or her valuable services with a small cash commission
and tie a higher percentage of that employee’s compensation to deferred equity-
based compensation with a distant future vesting date.123  Then, after the valua-
ble services are rendered, the employer could terminate the employee before the
vesting date of the equity-based compensation, pay the employee the small cash
commission for the valuable services rendered, and then deny the employee any
right to the whole of the unvested stock option compensation because it is not
protected by Labor Law Article 6, Section 193.124  Thus, the ruling in Guiry
effectively allows employers to take advantage of employees by denying unvested
equity-based compensation that has already been rightfully earned by the em-
ployee, the same protections as those which apply to statutorily defined “wages.”
123. Compensation in the form of deferred equity-based compensation with a future vesting date is the
equivalent of unvested deferred equity-based compensation, such as that at issue in Guiry.
124. N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 190(1), 193 (Consol. 2006).
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